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The performance of the Italian economy, like many other recent phenomena,
has confounded the expectations of conventional economic analysis. In the last
two years, Italy registered a rate of economic growth faster than any of its
partners in the European common market: it displayed the most rapid growth in
productivity, overall and particularly in the manufacturing sector. Its balance
of payments was at least as favorable as any in the common market. It did this,
despite an inflation rate of 20% a year (twice as high as that of the U.S.;
almost 3 times the rate of Western Germany, one of its major continental competi-
tors); despite a total dependence upon imported foreign oil and despite a
national wage structure tied to an inflation escalator in a complex way that some
analysts believe actually drives up wages faster than the price inflation for
which it is supposed to compensate. [1] The wage escalator is a product of one
of the strongest trade union organizations in modern history. So too are a whole
series of other restrictions on managerial freedom to hire and fire and pace work
which one might have supposed would further stifle national economic growth and
handicap Italian manufacturers in international competition.
But ultimately, we will argue, the political and economic organization of
the left, the trade unions and the Italian Communist Party (PCl),is a key to
explaining the recent evolution of the Italian economy. Much of this explanation
is paradoxical in the light of conventional thinking about economic development
and trade union activity, particularly in the United States. For that very
reason, it contains important lessons for us: lessons for American economists
who have shown a conspicuous failing to forecast economic events and to diagnose
and prescribe for the nation's economic ills: but also lessons for American
trade unions, who have been progressively losing ground in those sectors of the
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economy over which they once had mastery, and who find themselves suddenly on the
defensive in the political realm as well.
The center of the new wave of Italian growth is a vast network of very small
enterprises spread through the villages and small cities of central and Northeast
Italy, in and around Bologna, Florence, Ancona and Venice. The Italians
themselves have begun to call this area the Third Italy to distinguish it from
the older industrial triangle (defined by Milan, Turin, and Genoa), and the less
developed South. [2] These little shops range across the entire spectrum of the
modern industrial structure, from shoes, ceramics, textiles and garments on one
side, to motor cycles, agricultural equipment, automotive parts, and machine
tools on the other. The firms perform an enormous variety of the operations
associated with mass production, excluding only the kind of final assembly
involved in the automobile production line. The average size of the units varies
from industry to industry, but it is generally extremely small: shops of 10 or
less are not unusual.
In the last two years, we visited a number of these small shops and
interviewed proprietors, workers and trade union officials about the history of
the enterprise and their current operations. They are virtually all family
firms, and many in fact employ only family members. Workers in the shops say
they use artisanal rather than industrial techniques of production. [\] But
although many of these enterprises depend in some ways on the traditional Italian
family structure, and build on traditions of small craftsmanship, their
organization does not correspond to the popular image of a family of artisans at
work.
Somc^ of the small plants are simply sweatshops, where exploitation of
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previously under or unemployed workers compensates for priraative methods of
production. But there is also a significant group of firms which must be counted
as part of the most sophisticated and technologically advanced sectors of the
industries in which they operate. Most of the shops we vistied were of this
type. They work with machinery adapted to their unusual size and structure; and
they yield some of the highest earnings in Italy today.
The machine tool shops we visited near Bologna are clear examples of this
second, more modern, type of firm. [3] Here the most advanced factories have
been moved out of the house-hold into industrial parks built by the city. Some
of these parks have over 300 little shops of 10 to 15 people. The equipment is
modern and expensive: numerically controlled machines are increasingly common
even in the smallest shops. The lay-out and flow of work is fully rationalized
and industrial. There are also small shops in garages in residential
neighborhoods, definitely more crowded than those quartered in the industrial
parks, but with modern components and plans for further modernization.
But even in a poorer and more backward area of small industry like the
Adriatic province of the Marche, we saw obvious signs of technical and
organizational sophistication. [4] The typical factory in the Marche produces
shoes for the luxury market in Italy and abroad. It is housed in the ground
floor of a building, usually constructed within the last five years. Above the
factory are two or three floors of apartments for the several households of the
extended family which owns the factory. The workrooms are clean and spacious. A
number of hand operations are interspersed with the mechanized ones. But the
machinery is fully modern in technology and design. Sometimes it is exactly the
same as that found in a modern factory, sometimes a reduced version of a larger
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machine. The work is layed out rationally: the workpieces flow along miniature
conveyors whose twisting shape creates the impression of a factory in a doll
house. Not all the factories which we visted in the Marche, of course, look this
way: in a great many, production is still centered in the garage and the
stitching and finishing operations overflow into the dining room next door. But
the tendency is toward the other form of organization. The miniature conveyors
are everywhere; all factories seem to have some of the new pieces of equipment:
and the announced ambition of most families is to build their own
apartment/factory complex.
In all of these industries, the people work very hard. Children start to
work young and are expected to work summers and after school. But the industrial
sector no longer survives primarily through the exploitation of family members.
The pace of work, judged by comparison with contemporary American factories
producing comparable products, appears to be steady and deliberate but slow.
Work stops at noon for lunch: in the shoe factories, the family goes upstairs to
their apartments. The machine tool shops in the industrial parks of ten have
separate lunch rooms, as well as locker and washrooms. In some cases a large
industrial park is served by a collective cafeteria. People also live well:
they have expensive cars—a real luxury when one simply walks downstairs to work-
-and sometimes seaside condominiums. They are well traveled and visit frequently
the major cities of Italy, Germany, Great Britain and France, partly for business
but, evidently, with pleasure as well.
Two Views of Italian Decentralization
Where do these small businesses come from? How ultimately do they manage to
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survive?
The proximate cause of current developments was the extreme rigidity of
employment and work conditions which workers imposed in larger enterprises in the
late 1960's and early 1970's. In that period, the masses of unskilled workers
drawn from firms and artisans' shops into the large Northern factories during the
first economic miracle found that a booming economy, tight labor markets, and the
ruling Christian Democrats' weakening political authority allowed them to
seriously challenge, for the first time since the late 1940' s, management's
unilateral control over the work process. Where union organizations already
existed, they were dramatically strengthened; where none existed, new ones grew
up almost overnight. Generally the new institutions grew out of and were
reinforced by informal groups of workers which grew up on the shop floor. These-
organizations (formal and informal but eventually backed by national legislation)
made it extremely difficult to lay-off or discharge workers, either for economic
or for disciplinary reasons. They also exerted control over work practices and
plant operations which mangement found, psychologically if not always
technically, extremely restrictive. Of these the most burdensom on both counts
was the unions' capacity to limit through plant-level bargaining the pace of
assembly-line work and the percentage of time on the job spent actually working.
At the same time, partly as a result of labor's political power, but also
because the Italian state found it convenient to raise revenues for many purposes
through social welfare taxes, employers were forced to pay what amounts to a head
tax on every employed worker: extensive social security taxes and other fringe
benefits which now, in Italy, amount to 49% of the wages (compared to 26% in the
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U.S.; 39% in Germany.
Table I








Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1980
a) Computed from average hourly earnings and total compensation per hours worked.
b) Includes pay for time not worked.
The massive decentralization of production to small shops in the early
1970 's was a response to these developments. To escape the new shop floor
restriction s , large firms began to subcontract extensively to smaller and smaller
units of production. The smaller units were more economical because they escaped
union organization. They were able to discharge workers when demand dropped off;
they were much freer to organize work in their own way. In addition, they
escaped the union imposed fringe benefits, and often evaded state taxes and
fringes as well. In the beginning, wages were also below union-scale, reducing
costs still further. At that time, the decentralization production was less
efficient in a fundamental technical sense: given comparable wage and fringe
costs, and absent the restrictions upon discharge and on work practices, the
small firms would not have been able to compete for in-house production. If the
organized sector and legislative standards could be said to define the social
norm, decentralization represented a new form of exploitation.
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This set of developments was the basis for the interpretation of
decentral ization which, with different political accents, has dominated
discussion among trade unionists and industrialists of Italian industrial
structure from the mid 1970's almost to the present. One presupposition of this
view is that the future of manufacturing in Italy, as elsewhere in th(? advanced
industrial countries, lies in the giant, centralized factory with its economies
of scale and standard products. A second is that the unions' restrictive
practices in the large Northern factories, though (in the trade unions' version
of the argument) justifiable as a response to the management's unilateral powers,
amount in their current form to an unnatural obstacle to efficient organization.
Decentralization, on this view, is therefore seen as part of management's
bargaining strategy for reestablishing effective control over the plants. The
threat is straightforward: unless the unions relaxed their grip in the main
plants, they would see one phase of production after another shifted to the
artisanal sector; or, when economies of scale make that impossible, to
subsidiaries abroad. The dispute between management and labor was not a question
of whether production ought to be eventually recentraiized—both agreed that it
did—but rather a problem of just which restrictions to count as inherently
inefficient
.
This interpretation worked best as an explanation of the spread of sweat-
shops and homework since it was these which most openly violated all the rules
imposed on the large firms. [5] But linked to theories of industrial dualism, it
could be extended to explain at least part of the success of the more modern
small firms as well.
In a world dominated, as this view supposes, by standard products sold in
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mass market, it pays to invest in the highly specialized capital equipment
involved in deskilled jobs and automatic (or automated) manufacturing. But in
such a world, however, there are peaks in the demand for any one product.
Because these peaks are by definition short-lived, it is senseless to make a
long-term investment in highly specific equipment to satisfy them. For this
demand, it is economical to use a much more flexible labor force and less
specialized, more versatile tools which can be transferred to other uses when the
demand for any given product drops. The production of specialty items for which
demand is limited also requires a more versatile labor force, and flexible tools
and equipment. In these kinds of production, the economies of scale and
conglomeration are substantially smaller: in some cases, in fact, scale and
conglomeration are a real handicap to the continuous adaptation to shifting
markets and product design. The more unstable the world economy, moreover, the
greater the rom for specialty producers, since large firms will be less willing
to invest in products and production facilities which might be rendered
unattractive because of changes in raw materials prices, interest rates, and so
on. [6] One way of understanding post-1969 Italian development's, therefore, is
that the small scale sector in Italy has prospered by capturing, first in their
own domestic market and then abroad, a growing segment of industrial demand which
hs been artificially enlarged by political disturbances such as the oil
shocks.
There is certainly something to this view. It is true that decentralization
was and remains part of a larger bargaining strategy, and that the small firms
have prospered as subcontractors, filling in the gaps in the production strategy
of the parent firms. Nonetheless, this first interpretation slights three
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increasingly significant developments of the small sector, developments which can
be combined with experiences in other countries to produce a wholly different
understanding of the transformation of Italian industry.
The first set of developments has to do with the organization of production. \
People began to develop manufacturing techniques which have made the small shops
increasingly efficient. Machinery has been adapted to the small productive
units. Designers have begun to specialize in the solution of production problems
for these very small enterprises, and equipment manufacturers, themselves small
operations, to concentrate on the production of the required instruments of
production. In some cases the placement of large machines on the factory floor
is simply changed to fit the available space, or the larger equipment is
miniaturized. In other cases, however, artisanal techniques of smelting,
enameling, weaving, cutting or casting metal are designed into new machines, some
of which are controlled by sophisticated microprocessors. At the same time,
large enterprises have started to use sophisticated data processing techniques to
reduce the cost of passing production back and forth between the mother firm and
its small satellites. Together these advances have lead to a rapid increase in
the productivity of the small enterprises and reduced the element of
exploitation, understood as conditions of employment below the norm established
by collective agreement in the large enterprises, in the competition between
large and small-scale productive organization. [7]
The second set of factors has to do with the small firm's markets and the
design of their products. Initially, and despite the fact that they could
bargain over prices in good times, the subcontractors were the hostages of the
large firms good will and prosperity. Often the large clients delivered the
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tools, blueprints, and starting materials necessary to make a part. And since
most of a subcontractor's clients were likely to be in closely related fields, a
major economic downturn tended to affect all at once, making it difficult for the
small firm to offset the loss of some orders with an increase in others.
In part out of fear of this dependence, in part out of the desire to expand
business, and even in part, a fascination with new technologies many small firms
have broken the hammerlock of the large clients by developing and marketing
products of their own. Generally the new product is born out of the owner's
expertise of the market. He realizes that some variation of a successful, mass-
produced, good, or component part will be especially appealing to a certain group
of customers, whose complaints about existing products he may have heard for
years. He knows too that once he has begun to do business with such a group, he
will gain still more detailed knowledge of their needs, thus establishing himself
as an indispensible collaborator and breaking the big firm's control over the
definition of his products. [8]
Thus, in the shoe industry, the small enterprises produce for the high
fashion, high quality sector of the industry, where a premium is placed upon
distinctiveness and originality in design. They see themselves as mediating
between the very top of the fashion world, which is controlled by hautes coutures
of New York and Paris, and the mass production of cheap immitations of the
fashionable models for chain stores. Local designers travel to the major fashion
centers in Europe, when the haute couture houses present their shows, copy their
designs, and work from them to produce a large variety of models. The models are
then usually presented to high priced specialty shops of the "quality"
department stores who order particular items in small lots. The manufactures
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produce almost exclusively to order: they maintain virtually no inventories.
The designers are sometimes simply other small specialized firms who sell their
designs to manufacturers (often producing the patterns and cutting leather for
these designs as well). But sometimes the manufacturers themselves design the
shoe and subcontract only the pattern making. Virtually all the manufacturers
seem to travel abroad to trade shows, partly to look at new equipment or to
contract customers but also to develop an "eye" for the current fashions and to
place themselves in a position to judge the designs themselves.
Similarly, the motorbike industry around Bologna produces a specialty item,
a cut above the mass market but in no sense competitive in the professional
racing market, where bikes are precision engineered and produced to order.
Equipment manufacturers corae a little closer to entering a customers' market, but
again not a market for one shot deals. Thus, they tend to repeat with some
frequency the production of, for example, a given cigarette packing machine; but
the orders never justify the production of more than a few at one time. Single
orders, which are customed designed, are adaptations of a more general model for
which there is a more substantial demand. Parts production for these machines is
often subcontracted to other small machine shops, sometimes but not always
smaller than the manufacturer who sells the final equipment. And, again, the
machine shops are job shops: producing small lots but almost never unique
pieces
.
In practice of course the design of machinery suited to small-scale
production and the definition of new products do not go on in isolation from each
other. On the contrary, the use of new machines stimulates the search for new
products, and vice versa. One small shop we visited, which originally
-12-
specialized in the production of plastic chairs, invested in a particular
injection moulding machine only to discover that the bottom had dropped out of
the chair market. It saw its problem as one of inventing a new product, and
developed a nozzle for new kinds of irrigation systems which could be produced on
•the same machines. Conversely, the design of a new product calls for
modifications, sometimes substantial, of existing equipment.
The cross fertilization is carried out quite deliberately in the small
consulting firms which have emerged to serve the needs of the dynamic small
firms: engineers, machine designers, and draftsmen, all with extensive
production experience, shuttle back and forth between increasing the efficiency
of the existing small-scale operations and increasing the range of those
operations, using the knowledge gained in one phase of their work to suggest
solutions in the other. In one case a particularly foresighted owner of a
rapidly growing transmission firm established "industrial' and "artisanal"
production lines side-by-side in the hope of learning more about each from the
other. But most frequently ideas are exchanged between owners, skilled workers,
or consultants in different firms.
This constant innovation in products and production technologies in turn
depends on and reinforces a third aspect of the small sector: forms of
collaboration within and between firms which do not square well with the image of
independent enterprises competing for a limited number of spaces in the market.
Innovative small firms, first of all, rely on the close cooperation of workers
with dilferent kinds of expertise. This reliance follows from the firm's
relation to its clients. It does the small firm no good to propose a new,
customized product if the new design cannot be supplied at an affordable price.
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Hence discussion of design must be closely linked to discussion of production;
and the final blueprint, which must be available quickly, can only be drawn after
consultation between technicians and production workers who trust one another's
estimates and expertise.
The internal division of labor in these firms thus tends to be extremely
flexible. Owners, engineers, technicians, production heads, and skilled
craftsmen work in close contact with each other and hierarchical distinctions
tend to be treated as formalities. Unskilled workers, however, are often
excluded from this circle, particularly in large firms.
The need to collaborate in the production of new products and the perfection
of small-scale manufacturing technique shapes relations between the dynamic small
firms as well. Small dependent subcontractors in the same sector compete with
each other, no holds barred. But the more specialized each firm becomes, the
more likely they are to collaborate, subcontracting to each other or sharing the
cost of an innovation in machine design which would not pay for one producer to
order by himself. Often in fact the relations between the innovative firms
resembles the collegial relation between good doctors, good lawyers, or good
university teachers: each firm is jealous of its autonomy, over proud of its
capacities, but fully conscious that its success and very survival is linked to
the collective efforts of the conformity to which it belongs and whose^prosperity
it must defend.
One source of mutual dependence on related firms, we found, is the firm's
innovative strategy. At first a subcontractor seeks shelter from price
competition in intense specialization: the capacity to tailor a particular part
or component to special conditions. The disadvantage of this concentration of
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attention on one particular is that it distracts attention from all the others:
the moment the firm begins to expand and move beyond its original specialty it
finds itself dependent on the help of neighbors with complementary kinds of
specialities; and since the neighbors can never exactly anticipate when positions
will be reversed, the help is forthcoming.
The more the system of related, innovative small firms expands and prospers,
/ pressing against its original limits, the more explicit the collective character
of the activity becomes. The artisans realize that to expand business they must
increase the sophistication and range of their products; and the only means to
that end is to increase the range of sophistication of their capital equipment.
But investment in exotic equipment is risky. No one is likely to undertake it
unless he is confident that his friends will help him utilize the new machine by
passing along orders even when there is no immediate profit to them from doing
so: mistrust freezes technological progress of a whole sector,
trust fosters it. The same logic applies to every phase of business: where
invention creates demand and invention is collective, this a natural result.
This sense of mutual dependence is further reinforced by an appreciation of
economies of scale which can sometimes be achieved by explicit collaboration.
For most aspects of production, the small firms are not at adisadvantage because
of their size: they have found that economies of scale exist at the level of one
or a very few machines, not whole factories. Three lathes in each of three shops
are at least as efficient as nine lathes under one roof. [9] But firms, for
example, can seldom maintain white collar staffs to handle marketing, accounting
J or even technical services. This has led to a blossoming of cooperative service
organizations, associations of artisans and other small producers to pool
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resources. Consortia of small employers also purchase raw materials and secure
bank loans at better prices than single firms. Thus narrow economic
considerations combine with less precisely calculable ideas of collective
advantage to create a sense of professional solidarity which is the backdrop and
limit for competition between the firms.
To make sense of these aspects of decentralization, some observers have
begun to shift perspective. [10] Instead of seeing small firms as essentially a
response to disturbances in the natural operation of large-scale industry, they
see their successes as a sign and result of long-term trends in the organization
of factories in the advanced industrial countries. This view, which is beginning
to circulate among the small industrialists and the trade unionists most closely
in touch with them, rests on two related assumptions. One concerns structural
impediments to the continued success of mass production in the core industrial
countries; the other concerns the nature of industrial forms which may replace
it.
The first assumption is that the behavior of the labor force in the core
countries is in the long run an important, perhaps decisive obstacle to mass
production there. On this reading, the problems in large-scale manufacturing
facilities in Northern Italy are one more example of the trends in industrial
development which lead experienced industrial workers to reject the conditions of
work in large, bureaucratic industrial organization, and to seek to circumvent
them through union organization and work place restrictions. These conditions
were accepted in the earlier postwar decades because the work force was heavily
populated by new industrial recruits from rural areas or from a declining
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artisanal sector. Many of these recruits thought of industrial work as temporary
and planned to return: but even those who viewed their industrial commitment as
permanent measured the income and the conditions against the standard of rural
poverty in which they had grown up. As the realization spread in the 1960 's that
there was no real prospect of return and as the industrial labor force became
increasingly dominated by a second generation for whom there was no rural point
of comparison, conditions in industry were increasingly seen as unacceptable and
intolerable. This changing perspective, it is argued, sparked the riots in the
factories, not simply in Northern Italy, but in a number of other European
countries, whose industrial labor forces had previously been fed by recruits from
domestic agriculture and by foreign immigrants (a large niomber of them Italians)
as well. [11] The "guest workers" programs which most of Europe installed in the
1960 's are viewed as the last attempt to evade the consequences of the maturation
of their own domestic labor forces, but these seem to have failed because the
immigrant workers settled in much larger numbers, and the attitudes of those
settled workers changed far more rapidly than had been anticipated.
The upshoot of this view is that labor costs in the advanced, older
industrial countries will rise relative to the late-comers with labor forces new
to factory work. Since standard products are generally produced with mature
technologies easily installed in many parts of the developing world, this means
that labor troubles in the established factories open the way to the transfer of
production to developing areas.
The second assumption is that as mass production moves out of the core
countries, their manufacturing industry will be more and more directed towards
the kind of specialty markets now being created in Italy. [12] In part this
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outcome is regarded as merely a logical result of the first assumption: as low-
wage competition from developing countries grows, a reasonable response o£ core
industries will be to move up market and produce specialty goods suited to the .
particularities of local customers.
The shift to specialty production is however also thought to be partly the
result of economic changes unconnected to the use of labor. Of these influences
the most widely noted has been rapid fluctuation in the price of raw materials,
particularly oil. These fluctuations encourage experimentation in products and
production processes, calling established tastes into question and clearing the
way for a profusion of new designs. Increased government regulation of products
and processes, different from country to country, works the same way. These
tendencies are then seen as reinforcing the effects of labor difficulties on the
large firms, setting in motion a logic of differention whereby company after
company, industry after industry, each for reasons of its own, has begun to
specialize production, forcing its competitors to do the same.
In this light the success of the Italian small firms looks like a fortuitous
leap forward to a new and viable form of production. If mass markets are broken
up, capacity to make the largest number of different goods at the lowest total
price in the shortest total time will on this second view prove more important
than the ability to turn out any one, standard good at the lowest possible cost.
And the defining characteristics of the small Italian firm nicely meet the
general specifications for such flexible production: close collaboration between •
manufacturer and client; close collaboration between different groups within the
firm and between the firm and its neighbors; and, as a corollary to these,
general purpose machines, and a broadly skilled workforce. Although there may be
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many institutional forms other than the small firm for meeting these requirements
some parts of Italy may have stumbled onto a workable solution to problems which
will more and more preoccupy the core industrial countries. In sum, then, the
dynamic small scale production in Italy appears to emerge in a three part
process. It orginated in the decentralization of production from large factories
in the late 1960*8 and early 1970's as an effort on the part of
management to prevent regidification of production techniques in large factories.
This first phase gave rise to the first interpretation of the small forms as both
a club against the unions and as successful subcontractors in their own right.
Two subsequent developments are conceptually distinct although intertwined in
place and time. The first was an effort of the small producers, initially
operating on subcontracts from larger firms, to escape this subordination by
carving out nitches in the world market or developing new, specialized products,
the second was the adaptation of technology and managerial techniques which were
initially copied from the larger enterprises, to the peculiar needs of small
scale production. The lead in the development of new techniques came from some
of the small firms themselves, who, having solved their own production problems,
began to specialize in developing techniques in others, developing their
specialization into a market which gave them the much sought-after independence
from the demands of large scale enterprises. This phase of adaptation and
independence also saw the blossoming of new, cooperation institutions. Together
these developments encouraged a second interpretation of the small firms as a
distinct form of production appropriate to the emergent situation of the core
industrial countries.
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It is hard to find conclusive proof for either of these two interpretations.
Only time will tell if the growth of the specialty firms rest on growing share
of a stable or temporarily enlarged fringe sector, or on opportunities created by
the redefinition of the world market. But two strands of evidence incline us to
favor the second and more radical view. First there is growing significance of
the modern type of small firm: the rise in wage levels, success in international-
markets, and surge in investments and technological inventiveness characteristic
of some of the areas of decentralized production do not fit well with the image
of the small firms as subcontractors (if not sweatshops) living from cheap labor
and old equipment.
Although it is difficult to measure the relative weight of this new sector
of advanced firms, some aggregate statistics will give an idea of its vitality.
In Emilia-Romagna, the center of the small metalworking firms, wage levels in
1969 were 90% of the national average, and almost 20% below levels in Piedmont,
the richest industrial area. In 1977 wage levels were just over the national
average, and less than 4% below the Piedmontese standard. Investment per
employee, just under the Piedmontese level between 1971 and 1973, had risen to
about one and one half times the latter by 1975-1977. Because of the new
investments, productivity increases have keep pace with the rise in wage levels,
and the difference between the value of a worker's product and his wages or
cost to the firm continues to be extremely high in Emilia-Romagna: from 1971 to
73 it was 1,135,000 then current lira per employee in manufacturing industry,
rising to an average of 3,185,000 current lira from 1975-77. Between these same
two periods per capita value added in Piedmont rose from 832,000 to 2,484,000
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Lira. A further sign of prosperity are the region's tight labor markets. In
1966 the official unemployment rate in Emilia-Romagna was 1.3% above the national
figure, while the Piedmontese rate was 1.5% below. By 1978 the rates in the two
regions had drawn even at 2.8%, just short of 1% below the national average.
Detailed studies of technological change in the region's industries support this
picture of dynamism. But the most dramatic proof of prosperity is the rapid
advance of Modena, a manufacturing center regarded as the symbol of the Emilian
model, in the national league tables of provincial income: as measured by per
capita GNP, Modena was the 17th richest province in 1970, the third richest in
1978. Bologna moved from 14th to 6th, while Reggio-Emilia improved from 12th to
7th. [13]
Second, there is the growing tendency in large firms in and outside Italy to
move, however haltingly, in the direction of flexible production. Assembly
islands and job rotation in place of rigid assembly lines; flexible, computer
programmable equipment in place of single-purpose, dedicated machine tools:
these are widely seen as a response to the growing variability and
diversification of markets. The implication is that firms experimenting with
these new techniques of production are trying to adapt to the same forces which
are putting powerful winds in the sails of the small Italian firms. [14]
Later we will see that despite their differences these interpretations have
chastening and overlapping implications for American industrial policy. But
before turning to these lessons, it is necessary to look at some background
conditions of Italian developments which seem to limit or color their
significance for other nations: the role of family and artisanal traditions on
the one hand, and the labor movement on the other
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Artisanal and Family Traditions
Small scale Italian industry was not, of course, originally produced by
the large firms 'demand for decentralized, small subcontractors alone. There were
certain long-established features of Italian society which facilitated the
emergence of the new sector. One of these was the old artisanal tradition
itself, another the extended family which lives and works as a unit. But as we
will see in this section, the importance of both of these factors is easily and
often overestimated: Italian artisanal and familial traditions seem on balance
to have contributed to the growth of the innovative firms in some areas without
however serving as an indispensible precondition of their success.
The influence of the artisanal tradition is most noticeable in areas like
Erailia-Romagna, where centuries of handicraft product for international markets
created a web of relations and a store of knowledge of trading practices which
could be placed in the service of the new firms. In such areas many of the new
entrepreneurs and skilled workers learned their trade as artisans' apprentices;
and in a few instances traditional shapes gradually made the transition to modern
industrial work. [15]
But the really important role of the artisanal tradition seems to have been
less as a resevoir of manual and commercial experience than as the mold for the
legal and political vessel in which the small shops operate. The small scale
firms are included in a legal category which enables them to escape much of the
tax and labor legislation which governs the large enterprises: the Statuto dei
Laboratori, for example, which defines the unions' rights in the plant, does not
apply to firms employing 15 or less workers. This obviously gives the small
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firms numerous possibilities to reduce the direct costs of production and
increase the flexibility of their operations. [16] In this sense the crucial
significance of the term "artigiani" is legal in the same way that the
significance of a charter of corporation confers certain legal privileges on a
group of shareholders.
It is of course difficult to assess the advantage these privileges give the
small firms relative to the large ones, if only because the latter themselves
benefit from a complicated series of exemptions (including occasional
foregiveness of their social security obligations), as well as from the low
production costs of the former. [17] It is clear, however, that many small firms
could not have survived in the early 1970's without some form of exemption, just
as it is also clear that most successful, innovative small firms now pay such
high wages and offer such attractive working conditions that they could survive
without any special consideration. The point to underline here, and to which we
will return later, is that it was not the artisanal tradition per se
,
but rather
a set of political and legal provisions which might have arisen in a number of
different ways which proved most helpful to the small firms.
The tradition of family enterprise incarnated and idealized in the old
artisanal work shop and the family farm, admired from afar by landless farm hands
industrial operatives, has likewise facilitated the development of the new firms
without having served as an irreplacable foundation for them. This tradition has
contributed in three ways to the growth of the small sector: as a source of
labor, a source of entrepreneurship, and a source of capital. [18]
The tradition functions in this way almost as a matter of definition. It
ensuri^s that children will begin work young, sometimes at 14 or 15 or even
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earlier, in the family firm and often continue working there at wages lower than
outside. In the mid and late 1970's in Italy, it meant that some educated, young
people who went to school to avoid manual work, but for whom the economy cannot
provide white collar jobs, would accept jobs in a family firm out of loyalty to
the ideal. The same ideal has also facilitated the accumulation of capital
across generations and the pooling of resources of several different households
to finance plant and equipment. Finally generations of husbanding resources on a
small plot of land, often as a sharecropper or in a small artisan's shop, served
as a school for entrepreneurship, teaching people to adapt themselves quickly to
the market
.
At the same time, however, there seem to be ways of providing
entrepreneurship, capital, and labor for the small firms which do not rely in any
direct way on the family tradition at all. Some of the entrepreneurs in the
metal working sector, for example, are former skilled workers who were fired from
large factories during the purges of leftists in the 1950's: they used
their severence pay, skills, and connections with lower-level production managers
to set up small shops, which then benefited from the wave of decentralization at
the end of the 1970 's. In other cases the new firms were founded more recently
by younger skilled workers with the encouragement, and sometimes the financial
help, of their old companies; and in still others, the entrepreneurs come from
white collar families. Direct experience of entrepreneurship on the farm or in
the artisan's shop does not, therefore, seem the only way to acquire a taste for
it. [19]
Similarly, public and semi-public institutions provide alternatives to
family credit and labor. In some regions cooperative banks have acted as a
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complement, and at times a substitute, for family financing. This tradition is
particularly strong in the Venetian provinces, where it has been encouraged by
the Church, and in Emilia-Romagna, where it has been encouraged by the leftist
parties. [20] And labor reserves can be augmented through apprenticeship
programs and, where local youth refuse unskilled employment, the use of
immigrants. Again, Emilia-Romagna makes use of both. [21]
Examples of this kind suggest that artisanal and family traditions represent
only one of several paths to the same result. In fact it is reasonable to
suspect that other potential solutions to problems surrounding the creation of
the new firms were not tried simply because traditional mechanisms, formed
under completely different circumstances, answered the questions posed by the
growth of the modern small firms almost as soon as they were asked. Conversely,
as we will see in the next section, even institutions which appear exclusively
suited to the moden, centralized factory have played a part in the organization
of what, viewed from afar, looks like a traditional form of industry.
The Union Role
Where the importance of the family and artisanal traditions in the operation
of the Italian small firm sector is easily overestimated, the role of the trade
unions is easily underestimated or distorted. That role is complex and
contradictory, but it seems that on balance the trade unions have contributed to
the success of the most modern small firms, above all in areas like Emilia-
Romagna.
From what has been said so far it seems that the union's contribution to the
Croat von of the small firms was at best indirect, not to say inadvertent or
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unwilling. The unions endorsed and at times encouraged the rank and file
pressure for shop floor control over the organization of production in the large
plants. They thus became a major responsibility for the strategy of
rigidif icat ion, which in turn provoked the creation and expansion of many small
firms. It is not surprising, therefore, that the unions opposed efforts to
evade the new rules through decentralization to smaller units.
But while the unions were hardly enthusiastic about these developments in
the early 1970 's, and are just now coming to consider in « (detailed way the
possible advantages of development on the Erailian mode i , .he)? opposition to
decentralization was and continues to be restrained. In soniv^ areas, in fact, the
left moved from forebearance to encouragenifnl aiii! prumiition of the modern small
firms at the expense of the sweatshops. I'or i n.s; ,mk i-.' , ^hs we saw, in Bi'Iogna mui
Modena many of the small machine shops ar^j -;o,iH;.d in iniiustria! parks bui't ;>iid
financed by Communist municipal goveriT.i. : . A:^ .:':;.: Sctme govi/rnf-n^nt v; use
their control overzoning regulations !:..> rla- .-;: ha/.a rtious ! oundar i r-.s . \\'.\.!i
explains the unexpected cesLiaint? i^^.^ ^v.;.^ -•, 'vvs'b'-e the 8tii! mere i:vi')> '.;;»,;!> i y
col laborat ion?
Ultimately the laboi movement's Xfr.limnl "' ; t;.u)Led in the de M.Ti-in s- of
Communist-Socialist tr.ide unions to the PCI, uwd !>,:u M < u ! ar ly to t!i.- i'.irty's
analysis of modern Italian plitics. Central to that i nterpret at i "U is the view
that the success of facism was in large measure the result of the isolation of
the workers from other social classes oppressed by the evolution of monopoly
capitalism especially the peasants and petit bourgeoise. The keystone of the
party's postwar electoral strategy was thus the attempt to win over these groups
which had provided the foundations of Mussilini's political support. [22] Any
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effort to impose upon the small productive units either by law or through union
organization conditions equivalent to those of the large factories would have
jeopardized the future of this strategic alliance, dangerously antagonizing a
group which, the left feels, must be neutralized if it cannot be rallied to
transformative causes.
In those areas where the labor movement has begun to collaborate, however
judiciously, with the small firms, it has done so partly out of strategic
calculation and partly out of historical ties between the left and particular
groups of entrepreneurs. Calculation for example, encouraged the municipal
governments to build industrial parks as demonstrations of their capacity to
build a modern, urban environment. The labor movement's loyalty to some of the
small employers in Emilia-Romagna and elsewhere grows out of an irony of history
to which we referred earlier: some of the small employers began as skilled
workers, part of the group which formed the core of the anti-fascist underground
during World War Two and fell victim to the purges of the organized left in the
factories in the 1950's. The connection between the labor movement and the
entrepreneurs, moreover, is constantly being renewed because the tradition of
union organization among skilled workers has meant that some craftsmen have moved
up to start their own firms in recent years.
But by themselves neither strategic calculations nor historical loyalties
fully explain why small shop owners frequently belong to asociations which
bargain with the trade unions and respect many union standards, and this although
the workers are not always union members or have sometimes joined at the
employers urging. In fact, on closer inspection it turns out that traditional
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allegiances are more the catalyst than the underlying cause of the spread of
union influence to firms in which the union is not officially represented.
One way to make sense of the apparent paradox of union standards sustained
as much or more by employer pressure than worker organization is to look at them
in the light of what is known of dispersed but unionized industries in the United
States such as garments, trucking and construction. For it seems likely that
Italian developments are probably shaped by the same two forces at work there.
First, because there are in these industries a number of small firms
competing with each other for small orders and prices are constantly being
regenerated, entry is fairly easy and labor is relatively high proportionate to
total cost. The situation is very unstable and there is always the potential for
cut-throat competition which will result in the severe exploitation of the labor
force. Hence, there is a strong incentive to employers to support any measure
which stabilizes the conditions in the industry and narrows the range of
variables where competition takes place. But, second, the employers' interest in
this stability is largely as a group in the long run. In the short run, any
particular employer may have an individual interest in undercutting union
standards, particularly if he is hard pressed to survive. And, of course, if one
employer breaks ranks, all follow suit, since even the most efficient enterprise
cannot afford to respect union standards if his competitors are undercutting
him. Thus, employers want the union, but only if it is strong enough to control
the whole industry.
Given this rather delicate balance of economic interests on the employers
side, ideological and tempermental factors which contribute to the union's
strength become crucially important. For example, employees who start out as
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craftsmen and continue to workside by side with their employers, maintaining
close personal contact and a natural sympathy with them, are often reluctant to
survive through labor exploitation and the violation of union rules. Shared
craft experiences also help maintain the cohesion among the employers themselves.
Respect for labor standards is fostered not only out of loyalty to the work force
but also out of loyalty to other members of the employer group.
Even these kinds of bounds, however, are not always enough, and unions seem
to survive best in those situations where there is some other factor which links
workers and employers. In the New York City garment industry, that bond has been
common ethnicity, and one result of the United Jewish Appeal and Italian
orphanage campaigns in which the union and management organizations cooperate is
to cement the sentiments of the industry's stability. In the factories which we
visited in central Italy the common adherence of the employers and workers to the
left wing parties and ideology seems to perform a similar function. So does the
complicated web of kinship which links the two groups in any small community: in
Emilia-Romagna most workers seem to have an entrepreneur somewhere in the
family.
Still, even in those areas where it has gone farthest towards cooperating
with the small firms, the left has no coherent policy regarding decentralization.
The left's support and control within the small scale industrial sector has meant
that the conflict between the interest of the workers in the small and the large
firms, which might have been played out as a conflict between organized and
unorganized workers or between the left and right wing parties has become a
conflict within the left wing itself. The rule has been that the PCI defends the
artisans out of fear of offending them and the hope of gaining from alliance.
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while the unions try to curb the abuses in the small shops. Coordinated action
between the PCI and the unions is possible only in extreme cases: for example,
closing extremely hazardous plants. Both unions and the party, furthermore,
remain suspicious of a form of industry so apparently at odds with their visions
of modern, centralized rationality. The FIAT Mira Fiore works in Turin have long
been their image of the factory of the future. [23] Nonetheless, the explosive
growth of the small scale sector and the growing widely recognized need to raise
national productivity levels to international standards, are gradually forcing
the labor movement as a whole to think through the politics and economics of
their de facto cooperation with the small firms, slowly moving it to endorse what
we called the second interpretation of Italian developments, and to look at ways
of further integrating labor and the new firms.
In the last section we saw that Italy's family and artisanal traditions were
not indispensible to the creation of a sector of small scale industry. In this
one we saw that the unions are not necessarily inimical to it. The final two
sections connect these conclusions to the two earlier interpretations of
decentralization in an effort to draw out the meaning of Italian experience for
American debates on industrial policy.
Italian Decentralization and American Industry
Despite their differences, implications of both the interpretations of
Italian experience presented earlier ought to be sobering for American policy
makers. In fact, viewed in relation to the significance for industrial strategy
in this country, the difference between the two understandings of Italy is one of
kind not degree. The first, dualist explanation suggests that American policy is
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needlessly wasteful; the second, more radical reading of changes in labor and
product markets suggests that current thinking on industrial structure is
potentially disasterous.
On the first view, Italian developments seem broadly consistent with much
current economic policy in the United States, and especially the massive
relocation of industry from the North to the South. Here, as among many Italian
industrialists, it is widely believed that free markets are natural, self-
defining entities; that managers must be given a completely free hand if they are
to manage efficiently; that taxes and unions distort correct decisions; and that
the future is with the large factory. From this point of view the major
difference between Italy and the United States is just this: where the Italians
have been foced for political and geographic reasons to settle for piecemeal
decentralization to the politically protected artisanal sector, the Americans are
able to rebuild a major portion of their industrial base in the South, in the
bargain putting extreme pressure on Northern unions to make concessions.
This fundamental agreement, however, obscures an important aspect of the
dualist lesson of Italy: as the success of the new small firms shows, there is a
fringe of demand which flexible specialty firms can profitably capture. To
abandon the Northeast with its patrimony of skills, entrepreneurship and
experience in international markets maybe to forfeit the possibility of competing
in those markets. So even if a large part of the future lies with the large
factory, it is wasteful to reject out of hand the possibility that some of our
older industrial areas maybe suited to the kind of peripheral production which,
on this interpretation, is making the Third Italy rich. If the future does not
lie with large firms, of course, the picture of our future looks much worse.
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The first implication of the radical view of Italian developments for the United
States is that the policy of industrial displacement toward the South and
Southwest is simply not viable in the long run. The policy appears viable today
because it is able to draw upon the inexperienced labor reserves in those areas.
The availability of these workers creates a favorable political climate and an
attractive set of attitudes toward work in general and unions in particular, but
this, in the Europeans' interpretation of their own experiences, is basically a
biproduct of the novelty of industrial work. In the future (which the
suddenneses with which labor unrest broke out abroad suggests may be a good deal
closer to the present than anyone now suspects), as that novelty wears off, the
newly industrialized states will impose much the same restrictions as the old.
And if these restrictions are truly as crippling as industrial managers seem to
believe, large scale production will, in turn, move out of these areas
and locate abroad where, with lower labor costs and less troublesome unions, the
same technology can be used to produce the same goods at lower costs.
The second major implication of this view of Italian developments is that
the current neglect of the established industrial lives in the United States is
likely to prove extremely costly. In the present climate, almost any attempt to
aid the run down industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest is written off
as, at best, a confused effort to save "places, not people." [24] But in Italy,
where one village specializes in ceramic tiles, the next in small tractors, the
next in numerically controlled lathes, places define people as much as the
reverse: some kinds of business can only be done in certain places. And if the
success of the small Italian firms is any guide to the precondition of success in
the international economy of the future, then the accumulation of skills.
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knowledge of existing markets, and habits of dealing with a mass of
subcontractors and suppliers which are the partrimony of these ailing regions are
also the foundations of succesesful competition in the specialized markets to
come. If the strategy of rejuvinated mass production fails in the South and the
basis of specialized production is destroyed in the North, what industry will we
have left?
Fortunately, even if this second perspective is correct, the long run
prospects for the United States are not as bleak as they seem. For if economic
policy is a good deal more important in determining outcomes than most of us seem
to believe, it is also true that even the best program seldom succeeds as
planned, most wrong-headed one is rarely as disasterous, as might be expected.
There is always some room for firms and individuals to play on economic currents
running underneath the surface of events and so to produce outcomes which policy
by design or neglect would foreclose. And to the extent that some of the same
forces which led to the flowering of small businesses in central Italy operate in
the old industrial regions of own country, these regions will not simply atrophy
as national policy makers have prescribed. By a cheerless paradox, market forces
may offer us some limited protection against the advocates of the market.
Industrial New England and the raid-Atlantic States have in fact begun to
show an t^conomic resilience which, while perhaps not equivalent to that of
central Italy, is nonetheless similarily surprising, [25] After several decades
of secular decline and a period, from the late sixties to the mid seventies,
seventies when unemployment rates were substantially above the national average,
manufacturing employment in these regions appears to have stabilized. In a
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number of industries such as special machines, metal fabrication, knit goods, and
even (in New Hampshire) textiles, employment increases sharply between 1975 and
1980. The recession of last year almost bipassed the area: ' unemployment in
Southern New England remained steady despite sharp rises in the national level,
and in the Middle Atlantic states the increase was extremely mild compared to the
past two recessions which seeemed centered there. In March, 1981, unemployment
was 5,8 percent, the lowest for any industrial state except Texas. [26]
This reversal of past trends, is still so recent and so startling that it
has yet to be carefully examined and explained, but fragmentary evidence—much of
it annedotal—suggests that what is being played out here are precisely those
trends in international capitalistic development which underlie recent Italian
developments. The seventies did indeed see a reaction of industry to the shop
floor practices and general social and political climate generated by
an experienced, resourceful, and noncompliant industrial labor force, as well as
a migration of industrial jobs out of the regin to more "hospital" sections of
the country or less developed countries abroad. But what moved out was the
standardized industrial production, the long runs of traditional industrial
products and mass consumer goods. That movement has now been completed, and what
remains are specialty items, innovative products and new industry, high fashion
production, and perhaps, the overflow of standard industrial items which will not
sustain a commitment to permanent industrial facilities, the segments of demand,
in other words, where the region's skilled industrial labor force working in a
small shops, directed by entrepreneurs with a keen sense of the shifting markets
and eager to innovate in fashion and technology, located at the modal points of
transportation and communication but also of fashion and of scientific and
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engineering scholarship have, like that in northern Italy, a particular
advantage.
Typical in this respect is the ladies' garment industry. Once virtually the
whole industry was located in New York City. But in the postwar period, the City
had a steady leakage of employment, to rural areas of New York State and
Pennsylvania and to the Southern states and Puerto Rico. In much of the 1970 's,
there was a further transfer of employment opportunities to low wage countries in
Latin America and, particularly, in Asia. Most of what left the City, however,
was the mass production of standardized items, blue jeans, bras, panties, and the
like, for which it paid to breakdown the garment into sections and put it
together in assembly-line fashion with unskilled operators repeating the same
operations again and again on special machinery adapted with jigs and fixtures to
the particular production item. This movement was hightened in the late 1960's
and early 1970 's by a shift in fashion toward informal leisure type goods and
sportswear, the demand for which was less fickle in the very short run and which,
therefore, expanded the portion of output which lent itself to assembly type
production in facilities somewhat removed from the fashion center. Forsome time,
it has been axiomatic in certain circles that the life of the garment industry in
New York was limited.
But, in fact, there was a segment of the industry which was not moving.
Part of that segment is composed of high fashion items, the very top of every
line, the haute couture items sold in small numbers for the very rich who set the
style for the mass industry, but also mass consumption items in which design and
fashion are important and which, therefore, must be produced in small lots and
quickly, before the fashion changes. Most dress production, for example,
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remained behind. As one manufacturer put it, "If I tried to make it in South
Carolina, before I could ship out the design and ship back the product, the style
would have changed." But, it is also true that given thn numbers in which any
given dress is produced, it does not pay to set up an assembly line, breakdown
the garment, specialize the equipment and teach green operators how to do a
particular stitch. Dresses are produced in small shops by operators who stitch
the whole garment on general purpose sewing machines. What is true of the dress
industry as a whole, moreover, is true of a portion of every other segment even
these days blue jeans—has a high fashion component: but also because even for
standardized items, the business must be close to a fashion center and this
generally implies that a piece of the production process must be located there
too. One executive with extensive facilities in the rural South made ths point
as follows: "I am not going to sit in Greenville: this is where my customers
are and this is where my designers can feel the trends in air and this is where I
have got to be and that means I have got to start the garment and work it out in
some shop in Manhatten where if the belt doesn't sit right on the coat,
they can get in a cab and bring it up here in fifteen minutes. You can't have
200 women waiting at their machines, while I fly down to Greenville, Mississippi
to find out we need to take another stitch in the waist."
By the late 1970's, it was this core segment of the industry which was
specially, and uniquely adopted to the urban industrial environment of the City
that remained. This explains why employment has stabilized in the industry.
Employment prospects have been strengthened by fashion shifts, which have
introduced a greater element of flux and uncertainty into sportswear design so
that a portion of this production is moving back to the City as well. As risk
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and fashion shift overtime, garment employment in New York will no doubt continue
to vary as well. But the trend has stabilized. What appeared to be a long term
decline was a structural adjustment which has now run its course: what remains
draws on the natural strengths of the city as a commercial and industrial
community.
What is true of the garment industry in New York City is probably true of a
number of other industries as well. Thus, the whole string of industrial towns
running up the Connecticut Valley from Bridgeport through New Haven and Hartford
up to Springfield, Massachusetts and east to Worchester contain specialty machine
shops, machinists and machine tool manufacturers which once composed the American
machine building industry. Long runs of standardized machine tools and equipment
may no longer be profitable in this area, but the area has the same potential for
capturing specialty markets, prototype production, and innovation as do the
machine shops in Bologna. The resurgence of this potential, as the locational
redistribution of mass production comes to completion probably explains the
stabilization of employment trends here too. Still another example of a similar
phenomena is high technology in Eastern Massachusetts, a new industry with a very
high rate of innovation, which operates like fashion does in garments of
specialty production in machne tools, to place a primiura on skilled labor force,
relatively small scale, flexible production techniques, entrepreneurship and a
location as an urban modal point (in this case the university community around
Boston). Again, the phenomenon is not new: the Bostn area has been spinning off
small entrepreneurial firms and spawning new technologies for the last three
decades: some of them, like Polaroid, are now major industrial producers. But,
again, it is only as the long term locational changes in mass production
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industries run their course that these developments in industries where the area
retains a natural advantage have been able to dominate economic indices and
employment trends.
If, however, one can find traces of the forces generating the Italian model
in U.S. development in recent years, one cannot count on these forces to sustain
these developments unassisted, let alone to reproduce the miracle of central
Italy in New York or New England. The natural advantages of the older industrial
regions raaywell sustain them against industrially underdeveloped areas such as
the South and Southwest, but it will not protect them from other equally
mature urban economies. It is improbable that Atlanta or Los Angeles—let alone
Greenville, Mississippi—will ever displace New York as a garment center; but
Milan might well be able to do so. It is difficult to imagine Houston, Texas
capturing the markets of Bridgeport, Connecticut or Worchester, Massachusetts;
but Modena and Bologna are in very good positions to compete with those cities.
They are probably less well placed to compete with Boston for the innovative high
tech markets but there are cities in Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan
which have a scholarly tradition and industrial maturity which could well mount
such a competitive threat. The innovations in communications and transportation
wrought by the airplane and the computer do not enable a designer sitting in New
York to rearrange the belt on a dress in Greenville, Mississippi. The cognative
processes and human interactions involved in fashion, technical innovation, and
precision design may be such that urban conglomerations will always have a
commanding edge in these activities. But computer and air technologies do permit
the very rapid communication and transportation of finished output once
production is complete. For the specialty items in which urban centers have a
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productive advantage, the quality of the products, measured in terras of the
degree of innovation, its fashion content, or its efficiency in the particular
specialty for what it is designed, tend to dominate cost considerations. In
competition along these dimensions, it is easy to see American industry losing
out to products produced abroad and shipped. A case directly in point is the
competition between New England and central Italy in the shoe industry.
New England was once the center of the U.S. shoe industry in very much the
same sense that New York City was the garment industry center, and shoe
production, like garments, has moved south in the postwar decades. But
the movement in shoes went much farther than in garments and the result is that
the U.S. industry has lost the high fashion end of the business, largely to the
very small Italian firms discussed earlier in this paper. The conventional
wisdom is that the competitive advantage of these firms is low wages but, as we
have seen, the conventional wisdom is wrong: the advantage is precisely the
skill and conglomeration which were once possessed by New England.
American Industrial Policy
What does this imply for public policy? The first, and most obvious,
implication is a reversal of the current policy of abandonment in the North, and
the acceptance of public responsibilities in this region of the country. Given
the strains placed upon local and state fiscal systems by the Southern movement
of mass production, this means the provision of precisely the kinds of Federal
aid which the Reagan administration; is attempting to withdraw. Of particular
concern is the deterioration of the infrastructure of roads, bridges, sewer
systems, public transportation and the like which hold urban conglomerations
together and make them viable places to live and produce. The role of government
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is of paramount importance because the facilities are public : they are widely
shared and no single firm or industry has the resources or incentive to provide
them, if government does not. This is especially true in an area whose economy
is composed of a network of small firms. Many of the mass production facilities
opening in the South and Southwest are so large relative to the communities into
which they are moving that they might provide facilities which elsehwere are
publicly provided. This is clearly not the case in th^ North. Conceptually one
might distinguish this kind of hard governmental activity from social programs,
which do not directly sustain business activity. But to the extent that local
governments are forced by commanding political pressure to compensate for
declining Federal support in social programs with money diverted from other
budgets. Federal efforts to divert funds from social programs to capital outlays
are likely to be self-defeating. The pressures for social programs in the older
areas are, it is worth noting, a product of their own industrial maturity. The
same community, religious and family structures of the South and Southwest
which generate a pliant industrial labor force also provides many of the support
services which elsewhere depend upon government.
In the end, however, the commitment of public resources may not be
sufficient to sustain the small enterprise sector of the American economy in
world markets. We seem to lack intellectual categories in which to conceive of
this form of business activity and to fashion policies which are likely to foster
its development. These conceptual problems, moreover, reflect a structure of
business institutions which makes the existence of the type of firms which seems
to prosper in the Third Italy very problematic.
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In the United States, we really have two distinct, almost opposite
categories in which we understand businessmen and evaluate the activities in
which they are engaged. One is the independent small businessman—a kind of
courageous entrepreneur striking out on his own in some kind of daring new
enterprise; Schiompater ' s innovating enterpreneur , an Horatio Alger or Andrew
Carnagie, the economic equivalent of the Lone Ranger. It is in these terras
that the Western businessmen surrounding President Reagan seem to conceive of
themselves. The second business image is the corporate executive working his way
through a bureaucratic succession in a large corporation, through cooperation and
team work. (The cooperation, however, is supposed to stop at the organization's
boundaries: a hostile, competitive external environment ensures that internal
cooperation works toward efficient solutions to economic problems). The second
model of internal organizational cooperation has recently been reinforced by
admiring descriptions of successful Japanese firms.
The kinds of small business which have been so successful in Italy however,
involve a mixture of entrepreneurship and cooperation which fits neither of these
models of business activity. It involves entrepreneurship in the sense that the
small firms need to be continually on the look out for new markets, jumping from
one innovation to another, anticipating the rapid changes in taste and style;
lean and versatile; always ready to drop one project and take on another. But,
i as it developed in Italy it involves a good deal of cooperation as well. Part of
that cooperation is, in terms of American categories of though, perfectly
benoign, (although in terms of the two types of businesses just outlined, such
y cooperation is not really recognized): cooperatives for the purchase of raw
materials; for the provision of capital; to recruit labor; to build the
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industrial parks where the businesses are lodged, and the like. Other forms of
cooperation, if not actually excluded by our models, are extremely suspicious.
Many of the small firms in Italy, for example, subcontract among each other.
Some of the subcontacting firms are obviously complimentary; but a number of
other subcontracts have the outward trappings of sweatheart deals. Very often in
the garment or shoe industry, for example, two firms will compete with each other
for an order and, then, the winner will turn around and subcontract to the
looser. It is difficult in our terms to understand how competitors can cooperate
with each other in this way; and yet it would be impossible for them to accept
the risks of a high fashion environment without the security which such fallback
arrangements permit. Some of the cooperation among small firms is completely
foreclosed by the normative models built upon our two business categories.
Arrangements to fix wages through top down union organization or to fix material
prices through buying cooperatives which stabilize the market are, for example,
viewed as a monopolistic restraint upon trade, although they may well be
necessary to ensure that the firms compete on the basis of product innovation and
not on the basis of cost cutting and labor exploitation.
Nonetheless, however important the cooperation among these small firms they
do require real entrepreneurship as well. The entrepreneurship, moreover, is
continuous, it is not sufficient to invent one new product or create one
successful style. These industrial sectors survive by continual radical
adjustment. In the United States, we pride ourself on our business
entrepreneurship, but it is not clear that it is the continuous entrepreneurship
required to sustain small scale production in the long run.
The succesesion in small businesses from father to son is, in the United
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States, particularly problematic. The two types of business activity—the
independent entrepreneur and the bureaucratic corporation—actually dovetail here
in a manner which, from the point of view of a continuation of the
entrepreneurial tradition, is not idea. The key institutions mediating the
relationship are the conglomerate corporation and the business school. A typical
pattern is one in which the first generation entrepreneur has relatively little
formal education; often he comes from an immigrant backgrround: the son, who
follows him into the business, however, goes to business school. He develops
there contact and identification with other students who go directly into large
corporations. The entrepreneurial son returns upon graduation to his father's
business but not with the ambition of continuing it for life. Instead, he
attempts to build up the net worth of the corporation (and, hence, therefore of
the family which controls it) in the short run and, at the same time, develop a
market position which, from the point of view of a major corporation, is
strategic, i.e
.
, a particular product innovation, a process patent; a specially
advantageous sales location, or the like. In midcareer, this second generation
entrepreneur then plans to sell out his business to a larger corporation, moving
with it as an employee into the corporate hierarchy. Very often the corporation
having brought the whole of the business closes down a number of activities which
may have been viable as part of the small scale sector but which cannot in a
large organization be oriented to mass markets and run in a more regimented
bureaucratic fashion.
The problem then is really twofold: to develop a category of businesses
which corresponds to the real requirements of small scale production and to find
ways of populating that category on a continuing basis. Italians, of course, did
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not start with a solution to this problem. They have built it, we saw, from a
variety of materials: artisanal and family traditions as well as the peculiar
history of left wing politics which married entrepreneurial craftsmen with the
left wing notions of community and cooperation. Are comparable materials
available in American economic history and iconography? The closest equivalent
is the family farm and the network of support services built around the
agricultural extension service of the Federal government and the range. These
institutions have an honored, even hallowed, place in American political
discourse. Less honored but probably a good deal more relevant is the network of
labor and management organizations which have controlled work practices and
production techniques in the garment and construction industries. We have seen
some possibilities for cooperation between the advanced small firms and labor in
Italy which are being explored in Italy, and the parallels between the
organization of industry in the American Northeast and the Third Italy. Could
labor movement become in the United States, as it has in some regions in Italy,







Major EEC Countries 1968-1978 1979 1980
Italy 3.4 5.0 3.8^
Germany 3.5 4.5 1.8
France 4.4 3.2 1.8^
United Kingdom 2.3 1.0 -1.9^
Other Countries
United States 2.9 3.2 -0.1
Japan 6.6 5.9 5.5^
Austria 4.4 5.1 2.6^
Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, National Sources, NIESR estimates
a) estimate
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December, 1980
a) aggregntes were computed on the basis of 1979 values expressed in 1979 in
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percent of total labor
force, seasonally adjusted
Average
1964-1973 1974-1979 1979 1980*
Major EEC Countries
Italy 5.5 6.6 7.5 7.5
Germany"
France^
0.8 3.2 3.2 3.3
2.2 4.5 5.9 6.3
United Kingdom 3.1 5.1 5.8 7.4
Other Countries
United States 4.4 6.6 5.7 7.0
Japan 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.0
Austria*^ 2.2 1.9 2.0 n/a
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December 1980, and NIESR estimates
a) NIESR estimates
b) adjusted to international definitions by OECD
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December 1980.
a) forecast values








Italy 3.7 3.1 9.3
Ge rmany 5.3 3.6 5.2
France 4.8 4.9 4.7
United Kingdom .5 1.2 1.7
Other Countries
United States 1.4 0.4 0.8
Japan 6.9 6.8 8.1
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Germany 3.5 4.5 1.8
France 4.4 3.2 1.8^





Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, National Sources, NIESR estimates,
a) estimate
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Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December, 1980
a) aggregates were computed on the basis of 1979 values expressed in 1979 in
U.S. dollars.
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force, seasonally adjusted
Average
1964-1973 1974-1979 1979 1980=
Major EEC Countries
Italy 5.5 6.6 7.5 7.5
Germany
France^
0.8 3.2 3.2 3.3
2.2 4.5 5.9 6.3
United Kingdom^ 3.1 5.1 5.8 7.4
Other Countries
United States 4.4 6.6 5.7 7.0
Japan 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.0
Austria^ 2.2 1.9 2.0 n/a
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December 1980, and NIESR estimates
a) NIESR estimates
b) adjusted to international definitions by OECD
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Sourer-: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December 1980.
a) forecast values
b) GDP including North Sea oil
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PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING





























Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, December 1980.
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CURRENT BALANCES
$ billion; seasonally adjusted,
expressed at annual rates










2.5 6.2 5.1 -5 V*
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-3.0 -1.4 -1.8 -4.2
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook 28, December 1980.
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1981^ 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969^ 1968^
5.6 5.5 6.1 8.1 9.5 11.2 7.2 6.7 6.4 6.6 5.3 3.9 4.1
5.9 5.1 5.2 7.0 9.5 9.1 6.2 5.7 8.2 8.9 5.6 3.8 3.7
4.7 3.1 3.8 5.9 6.4 9.0 4.8 3.9 4.5 4.7 3.3 2.9 1.8
7.2 6.6 6.6 8.6 8.1 11.2 7.1 6.2 6.5 6.8 5.2 3.6 3.6
7.2 6.9 7.2 9.4 10.4 10.2 6.9 5.6 5.8 5.7 4.6 4.4 4.5
7.6 7.1 7.7 9.1 10.3 9.5 6.3 5.4 6.7 6.6 4.5 3.5 3.5
8.6 8.7 8.9 10.8 11.1 10. 6^ 6.0 7.0 6.7 4.8 3.6 3.1
7.1 5.8 6.0 7.0 7.7 8.5 5.6 4.9 5.6 5.9 4.9 3.5 3.6
1. February, 1981
2. 1969 and 1968 rates not comprable to 1970-81 series




Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eraplojnnent earnings 1981
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Statistics Handbook 1980




UNEMPLOYMENT RATIOS, SELECTED NEW ENGLAND AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES TO U.S.
1968-1981
1981 ^ 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 ^ 1969 ^ 1968 ^
State
MA .88 .79 .95 1.01 1.16 1.23 1.32 1.29 1.37 1.14 1.12 1.08 1.11 1.14
CT .93 .83 .88 .87 1.00 1.23 1.07 1.11 1.16 1.46 1.51 1.14 1.09 1.03
NH .71 .66 .53 .63 .84 .83 1.06 ,86 .80 .80 .80 .67 .83 .50
RI 1.19 1.01 1.14 1.10 1.23 1.05 1.32 1.27 1.27 1.16 1.15 1.08 1.03 1.00
NJ 1.05 1.01 1.19 1.20 1.34 1.35 1.20 1.123 1.14 1.04 .97 .94 1.26 1.25
NY 1.12 1.07 1.22 1.28 1.30 1.34 1.12 1.13 1.10 1.20 1.12 .92 1.00 .97
NYC 1.28 1.21 1.50 1.48 1.54 1.44 1.253 1. 22^1. 25 1.14 .98 1.03 .86
1. February 1981
2. 1969 and 1968 ratios not comparable to 1970-1981 series
3. 1968-1973 rates not comparable to 1975-1981
Source: 1979-1981: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 1981
1975-1978: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Statistics Handbook 1980
1970-1974: President's Manpower Report 1975 (consistent with BLS
figures)
1968-1969: President's Manpower Report 1974
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Table lie
NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT DECLINE DURING RECESSIONS, NEW ENGLAND
and the UNITED STATES, percentage decline
Percentage Decline
Recession Years United States New England Ratio of New England to U.S.
1960 - 61 2.3 1.1 0.48
1969 - 70 1.4 3.1 2.21
1973 - 75 2.9 4.3 1.48
1979 - 81 1.3 1.8 1.38
Source: Richard Syron, "Regional Experience During Business Cycles," New England
Economic Review, Nov. - Dec. 1978.
Updated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Table lid
MASSACHUSETETS EMPLOYMENT IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY ^
1979 1978 1977 1976 1975
High Tech employment 222.0 206.4 190.8 172.8 167.6
(thousands)
Total manufacturing 671.7 652.9 618.3 595.2 577.6
(thousands)
Ratio High Tech to 33.0% 31.6% 30.9% 29.0% 29.0%
Total Manufacturing
Ratio MA High Tech 6.5% 6.4% 6.3% 6.1% 6.1%
to U.S. High Tech
1. High Tech employment defined as employment in 20 SIC code industry groups:
Drugs (SIC 283); Ordanace and Accessories, NEC (SIC 348); Office
Computing and Accounting Machine (SIC 357); Electrical and Electronic
Machinery, Equipment and Supplies (SIC 361-367, 369); Guided Missiles
and Space Vehicles and Parts (SIC 376); Miscellaneous Transportation
Rquipm(Mit (SIC 379); Measuring, Analysing, and Controlling Instrument,
photographic, medical, and optical goods; watches and clocks (SIC 381-
387).
Source: MA Department of Employment Security, High Technology Employment in
Massachusetts and Selected States, 1980.
I
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Hanufaclur ln{; 670. :» 652.4 521.0 539.6 5/7.(1 539.3 634 .
7
610.2.
Prlraiiry MiMnl IndusirlfH 17.5 17.1 16.9 16.1 1'..5 17.3 16.2 14.0
KnbrJialtitl Mt-LnJ I'tikIucLm 54.5 53.2 51.8 50.4 49.2 57.2 55.1 5Z.2




Machinery, Except Electrical 100.3 90.4 82.0 74.0 74.0 78.5 73.1 66.0
Metalworking Machinery 17.6 16.4 15.4 14.4 14.6 16.1 14.6 12.9
Special Industry Machinery 17.6 16.4 15.1 15.7 15.1 17.7 16.6 15.1
Electric & Electric Equipment 104.1 98.3 91.0 83.8 82.8 93.7 88.
1
81.6
CoDuitunicatlon Equipment 29.7 28.1 25.0 24.1 28.6 28.5 25.8 26.9
Electronic Components & 44.1 39.4 35.8 30.5 27.0 32.7 30.1 25.5
Accessories •
Transportation Equipment 37.0 36.4 33.2 31.2 30.0 30.5 33.2 34.3
Instruments & Related 58.0 56.7 51.5 45.1 43.7 47.2 43.0 38.6
Products
.*
Textile Mill Products 27.2 28.2 27.9 27.7 25.2 28.7
. 31.1 31.0
Weaving Hills, Cotton & 4.5 4.4 4.0 3.9 3.2 4.3 4.1 3.4
Synthetics
Weaving 4 Finishing Mills, 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 1-5, 2.3 2.9 3.2
Wool
Apparel 4 Other Textile 41.1 42.1 42.8 43.2 41.1 44.2 45.8 45.9
Products
T;ll>le llc.l




Source: Board of Labor Statistics Employment and Earnings, States and Areas
Industry 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 , 1973 1972







9.5 9.5 10.1 9.6 8.9 9.8 10.4 10.0
21.4 22.0 22.1 22.5 21.2 22.5 22.8 23.3
44.1 42.9 42.2 41.0 40.'3 42.0 43.5 43.9
33.0 32.1 30.3 29.6 27.8 33.7 34.6 32.2
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New York
Employiiii'iit ill 'lliouGnnLts
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'"di'stiy I'r/y 197H 1977 1976 1975 1974. 1973 1972
Manufacturing 1 ,/.98.9 1,481.2 1,459.6 1,438.9 1,421.9 1,574.6 1,619.1 1,602.2
Misc. NonmctalHc Mineral
Products
13.5 12.9 12.3 12.0 11.4 13.6 14.3 13.5
Primary Metal Industries 58.5 56.6 57.8 58.6 57.9 69.7 70.0 63.7
BlasL Furnace 6 Basic
Steel Products
20.9 20.5 21.8 21.9 2i;5 26.6 26.5 22.2
Iron & Steel KouudarlcH 9.4 9.2 9.3 8.9 9.1 10.0 10.0 9.8
NonfcrrouB Rolling and
Drliwin{>
14.6 J3.6 ]3.8 14.8 14.8 17.9 18.1 17.4
NonferruuH rinitidi' Irn 6.7 6.5 6.2 6.2 5.7 7.2 7.2 6.7
F/ihrlcnlcd Mi'lnl ProdnctN 84.5 84.2 8il.9 78.
5
77.5 88.7 9J.0 90.0
Cutlfry, Hand 'I'ouIm &
Hardware
11.4 11.8 11.3 l).l 10.8 12.7 12.5 11.9
Falirlcated .Structural Metal
Products
23.2 22.5 22.2 22.4 23.6 26.4 26.7 27.1
Screw Macliinc Products,
Bolt.s, Etc.
6.2 5.8 5.1 4.6 4.5 - • - -
Metal Forglngs and
Stampings
16.0 16.1 15.5 14.4 13.1 15.6 16.5 15.7
Misc. Fabricated Metal
Products
10.4 10.4 9.7 9.5 8.9. - - -
Machinery, Except Electrical 173.5 166.8 158.0 152.8 155.8 171.5 164.2 156.2
Engines and Turbines 17.7 18.5 18.4 17.7 17.6 18.5 18.6 18.3
Tnlili- II f.l




Source : Board of Labor Statistics Employment and Earnings, States and Areas
Industry 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974, 1973 1972
























20.9 19.9 18.6 17.3 17.6 20.5 19.2 17.5
14.1 13.5 12.7 12.3 12.5 13.5 13.4 12.9
28.0 26.7 26.0 25.1 25'. 2 26.2 24.0 22.8
54.4 51.9 47.5 47.1 48.9 53.1 49.4 48.3
6.0 S.B 5.5 5.0 4.9 5.6 6.2 6.3
26.5 24.9 23.6 22.7 21.9 26.3 27.3 25.5
44.4 42.4 40.7 39.4 40.0 42.4 43.2 43.9
41.7 37.8 34.7 33.7 33.2 37.9 36.1 32.6
11.7
T.ll.l,- II,.,
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'"<'"»"'y 1979 1978 1977 1976 197^ 19;/i 1973 1972
Manufacturing 116.0 109.8 101.4 94.5 85.1 94.2 96.0 90.8
Primary Metal Industries 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.5
Fabricated Metal Products 7.1 6.6 5.8 5.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.4
Machinery, Except Electrics 21.2 18.9 16.0 12.5 11.4 12.1 il.3 10.3
Electric & Electronic 18.5 16.6 15.5 14.9 13.0 14.8 14.9 13.2
Equipment
•
Misc. Manufacturing 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5
Industries
Textile Mill Products 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.0 4.5 6.1 7.2 7.1
Apparel & Other Textile 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6
Products
Printing 6. Publishing 5.9 5.5 5.1 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.8
Tnhle Jlh




Source: Board of Labor Statistics Employment and Earnings, States and Areas













Food and Kindred Products
Textile Mill Products
Apparel i. Other Textile
Products
435.1 419.6 406.7 397.0 389.8 430.9 420.2 400.1
315.9 300.8 289.8 281.7 277.0 307.8 296.4 279.8
22.0 20.9 19.8 20.2 19.8 23.4 23.1 22.2
66.8 65.5 62.9 62.1 61.3 70.2 68.5 65.8
60.7 58.8 58.4 55.4 56.5 60.2 57.1 52.6
49.7 47.8 43.4 40.7 38.5 45.2 44.4 42.0
84.2 75.0 74.2 73.4 72.9 78.3 74.7 69.3
24.0 24.0 22.4 21.8 20.5 21.5 19.7 18.7
119.2 118.8 116.9 115.3 112.8 123.1 123.8 120.3
12.6 12.6 12.3 12.5 il.8 12.1 12.5 12.7
9.2 9.9 10.3 10.7 9.8 12.0 13.0 12.6
11.5 12.0 11.4 11.7 11.2; 11.9 12.9 12.9
Printing i Puhll.'ihlng 24.0 22.9 21.8 21.2 20.6 21.2 20.5 20.2
FOOTNOTES
1. For summary statistics on recent Italian economic performance, see
Appendix I.
2. Bagnasco (1977).
3. These and subsequent observations on Emilia-Romagna are based on plant visits
in the Spring of 1980 and 1981. Earlier studies of this area include Federazione
Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (1975 and 1977), and Capecchi and Pugliese (1978).
4. The following is based on plant visits in February 1980. For an earlier
study of this see U. Ascoli and A. Trento (1975).
5. Accordingly analysis of decentralization in the earlier 1970 's focused on
evasion of contractual and legislative controls, the use of antiquated machinery
and more generally the retrograde character of small-scale production. See for
example Frey (1973), and David and Pottario (1975). For a summary of this early
literature see Livraghi (1977).
6. Berger and Piore (1980).
7. These remarks are based on interviews with machine designers in Emilia-
Romagna in the Spring of 1980 and 1981. Russo (1980), is an excellent
description of technological innovation in the small firms producing ceramic
tiles. Another well documented example is the machine tool industry which
combines technological sophistication and pronounced decentralization: in 1977,
40 percent of the Italians in the industry worked in firms employing up to 100
workers, compared to 12 percent in West Germany and 23 percent in the United
States. Gaibisso (1980), p. 29. Italy is now the second largest producer of
numerically controlled machine tools in Europe, after West Germany and well ahead
of France and Great Britain. As of 1975, 20 percent of numerically-controlled
machines in use in Italy were located in shops employing between 20 and 49
workers and their use in small firms was increasingly rapidly. See Rolfo (1980),
pp. 126 - 129. For detailed evidence of the technological sophistication of the
industry, see Tarento et al. (1979), pp. 163 - 187.
8. A good case study of the emergence and operation of the system of
specialized, small scale production outlined in the next paragraphs is Lorenoni's
(1979), account of the textile industry near Prato. See also Saba (1980).
9. Brusco (1975).
10. See for example Bagnasco and Pini (1981), Capecchi (1981).
11. See Piore (1979), for the general argument. Sabel (1982), discusses the
Italian case in detail. Europeans, particularly if they are Marxist, accept the
general form of the argument but put more emphasis on the rebellion of young
workers (whose attitudes appear to be the product of capitalism itself) than on
the reaction of peasant workers new to industrial work. See Coriat (1979).
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12. Evidence for the growing importance of specialty markets in the Long-term
strategy of core industries in the advanced countries is presented in Sabel
(1982).
13. Wage levels are reported in Bagnasco (1981), p. 105; investment and value-
added per employer, p. 54; and unemployment rates, p. 92, All of these figures,
as well as the league tables of provincial wealth, were compiled using ISTAT data
from the appropriate years.
14. Butera (1980), p. 43; Coriat (1979), pp. 237 - 261; Altmann et . al. (1980).
15. See, for example, the discussion of the early history of Bolognese industry
in Commune di Bologna (1980).
16. Berger and Piore (1980).
17. A good accounting of the legal advantages of the small firms is Ricolfi
(1979).
18. This interpretation is developed most clearly in Pacci (1980).
19. These remarks are based on interviews with entrepreneurs in Emilia-Romagna,
the Marche, and the Venetian provinces. Bagnasco comes to similar conclusions.
Using data from a survey by Demoskopea in 1974, he found that in the province of
Treviso, a center of decentralized production, 14 percent of entrepreneurs in the
metal working sector were the sons of small or tenant farmers or agricultural day
labors; 16.4 percent the sons of artisans; while the rest were the offspring of
workers (21.8 percent), shopkeepers (18.8), white collar workers (10.9 percent)
of high managers and professionals (11.7 percent). Bagnasco (1981), p. 30.
20. See on the history of the cooperative movement, Degl ' Innocent i (1981).
21. See on the growing number of artisans in Emilia-Romagna (partly as a result
of efforts to hire extra labors without exceeding the official limit of 15 full-
time employees on firms qualifying for artisans' priviledges) . Trevisani
(1981). On the use of immigrants see Morelli (1980).
22. For the PCl's alliance strategy, see Hellman (1975).
23. These remarks are based on numerous discussions with officials of the
metalworkers' union in Emilia-Romagna and Turin.
24. See, for example, President's Commission for a National Agenda for the
Eighties (1980), especially pp. 71 - 86.
25. On the role of small business in the New England Renaissance see Birch
(1980), and Brown and Hellman (1981).
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